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THE MUSSULMAN, THE MARATHA AND THE EUROPEAN

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THE MUSSULMAN, THE MARATHA, AND THE EUROPEAN.

Two Introductory Lectures

ON THE

RISE OF THE ENGLISH POWER IN INDIA.

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BY

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LECTURE I.[a]

ON several accounts, and in several distinct points of view, the history of the Mahometan dynasty of Mysore is memorable and instructive.

The vicissitudes of the story constitute it a theme of surpassing interest. And few characters could be pointed out more remarkable in themselves, more sharply defined, or more directly operative on each great stage in the fortunes of their house, than those of Hyder Ally and his son Tippoo Sultan. Yet, on the other hand, so pliant and malleable are the facts of history, so readily do they lend themselves to the illustration of at least verbally antagonistic theories; that rarely would an Oriental, impressed with the idea of an overruling *kismet* or destiny, find a more inviting subject for reflection, than in the rise and fall of that gifted but foredoomed house. While a Western student, without ignoring either the inscrutable dispensations of Providence, or the powerful and continuous moulding force of individual character, discerns as he follows out the strange story of that rise and fall, not only a modifying circumstance, but a new and copious source of interest, both in the general politics of the time, and in the peculiarities of the geography amidst which the history was enacted.

I have called that history a strange story. It was so

[a] Introductory to a Course on the History of Hyder Ally, delivered a year ago.

indeed. But the term very inadequately describes the reality. Few historical passages comprise, within an equal limit of time and space, a series of events more striking, or in several respects more instructive. In the case of Hyder we see an illiterate Mahometan adventurer win his way to supreme power in a Hindoo community, by a boldness and an originality of artifice which while we condemn we cannot but admire; frequently overpowered by the force of external circumstances, yet rise superior to each reverse, and more indomitable and threatening from each disaster; secure internal tranquillity by a system of administration equally simple, effective, and awe-striking; extend the limits of the kingdom, until it stretches nearly from sea to sea, and includes a large part of Southern India; grapple with the jealous and formidable hordes of the North, in campaigns that wear throughout an air of the marvellous, and carry us back in association to Alfred's combats with the Danes; meet at last on no unequal terms the armies of England, and emerge victorious from the strife; pitted in a second encounter against our ablest General (Clive perhaps excepted), and though more than once defeated, in the end almost victorious over him. Thus subtle, vigorous, terrible to his life's end, he leaves behind

"A name at which the world grew pale,"

and a reputation second to that of none of the military adventurers, whom we have encountered in the East.

Tippoo's character and fortunes, though very different, were hardly less singular. It was once shrewdly remarked by a native, that the father was just the man to

found, the son to destroy, an empire. And so the event proved. The father, as I have said, was illiterate; the son, for an Oriental, was carefully and highly educated. The father, though incessantly active, was economical in his activity; calm, clear, and statesman-like in his judgment; determined and steady in the pursuit of what was, from his own point of view, expedient. The son was an eddying and furious vortex of impulses and passions; inconsistent, wild, revolutionary almost to madness. He could let nothing alone, and he changed everything for the worse. Internal administration, the established relations of Mysore with other states, the army, the very names of officials and of places, and last, but not least momentous in an Oriental tyrant and a Mussulman fanatic, religion itself, all must undergo the process of his capricious remodelling. The wise and fostering, though grim ruler was exchanged for the exasperating domiciliary inquisitor; the statesman was replaced by the political incendiary; the army, inured to victory by the general, was enfeebled by the martinet; old and useful associations were destroyed; not only was Hyder's toleration abandoned, but the very fanatic for the Koran was lost in the infatuated propagator of what was virtually a new dispensation, of which Tippoo rather than Mahomet was the prophet. Thus all things had become new, and Hyder's work was being rapidly undone. *He* had broken unwillingly with the English in the first instance; and throughout he was coldly crafty, and deliberately energetic, rather than acrimonious in his warfare with them. Not so Tippoo. He hated them with more than Hannibal's hatred of the Romans; with all the fiery and malignant intensity of

his jealous, wrathful, and uncompromising temper. Once he braved them, and lost half his empire. Again he sought to link his fortunes with those of revolutionary France, and her representative Buonaparte. But Wellesley was too quick for him. And his mystic faith in the impregnability of his capital, and the strange rites which, instructed by the Brahmins, whom he had cruelly persecuted, he practised in his last hours, Saul like, to avert his fate, did not avail to obviate a catastrophe that he had himself prepared; but in which he perished grandly, like Palæologus, fighting desperately in the breach. Such, in brief, was the career of Tippoo, if not a great, undoubtedly a very remarkable man, and one not destitute of some of the elements of greatness.

But the personal interest of the story, though it revolves around the founder and the subverter of the dynasty, takes a wider range, and comprises a great variety of conspicuous and notable characters. Hyder so promptly and effectually disposed of his early rivals, that we know less of them than could have been wished. His patron, Nunjeraj, whom he had supplanted, then restored to suit a temporary purpose, then quietly put aside for ever—we may pity. But he interests us chiefly as a foil to Hyder's extreme astuteness, which so completely and repeatedly deceived the Brahmin Prime-Minister: while another Brahmin, whom the fortunate adventurer defeats in an attempt to treat him precisely as he had treated Nunjeraj, looms indistinctly upon us through the bars of the iron cage, in which he spent the miserable remnant of his life like, says a native writer, "an inauspicious crow." But without the limits of Mysore, we can admire as well as pity his antagonists.

Such was the Peishwa Mâdoo Rao, no commonplace official, either as a ruler or as a general. Such, too, was the minor but hardly less influential Maratha chief, the wily, enterprising, and long successful lord of Gooti, Morari Rao: such again were the gallant Poligar of Chittledroog, the chivalrous Rajah of Coorg, the self-immolated Zamorin of Calicut. So too with his co-adjutors and lieutenants. Fuzzul Oollah Khan, the stipulated partner of his viceregal honors; Meer Ally Reza, his trusted lieutenant in the north, the betrayer of his trust, the reconciled and fast friend till death of one who, however merciless at times, knew how to forgive so as to secure henceforth the zealous services of an invaluable ally; and, above all, the hero of the great Maratha war, Mahomed Ally, excite no little interest by their careers, and more by the tragic close to which the ingratitude of Hyder himself, or the suspicious tyranny and vindictive jealousy of Tippoo, doomed one or other of them.

But, if what I may call the native portion of Hyder's career, even apart from that excited by the hero, abounds with personal interest, far more is this the case when the stream of his destinies has merged in the broad channel of Anglo-Indian history. Some of our most famous men then play their parts, and contribute largely to determine, by their conduct in relation to Mysore, both the fortunes of that power, and the position and reputation of England in the East.

In the first war, indeed, it is painful and humiliating to see Smith's military skill at once holding Hyder in check, beating him in the field, and inspiring him with

awe, yet systematically thwarted and rendered useless by the imbecile councils and narrow prejudices of the civil government. But in the second, after a reverse that in its circumstances bears no slight resemblance to the overthrow of Varus, our drooping colours are raised once more, and new laurels won for England, by the masterly combinations of Coote; and the same scenes which had witnessed his earlier triumphs over the French, are irradiated by the sunset glow of his military genius. Warren Hastings meanwhile watches the strife from afar, and exerts his great energies to minister, not always in the purest way, to its support.

Time passes on. Coote is no more. Hyder's son is on the throne of Mysore. Hastings has been impeached. Burke's eloquence has immortalised and misrepresented the invasion of the Carnatic. Tippoo, following in his father's steps, without his father's wariness or provocation, attacks us again, through our Travancore ally. Then is exhibited, in the person of the Governor-General, one of the most illustrious and winning examples of virtue in high place, which the world has ever afforded. Cornwallis unites, with respectable military abilities and indefatigable attention to business, the refinement of a perfect gentleman, the moral rectitude of an ideal Stoic, and the simple piety of a sincere Christian. Firm to avenge, equitable in his adjustment of retribution, delicate to fastidiousness in sparing the feelings, and soothing, as far as may be, the woes of the conquered, he is in his combined characteristics almost unique among the stern class of conquerors. Again Tippoo's hostile designs demand attention. And the

imperial Wellesley develops his views in some of the most luminously argumentative State-papers that we possess; and challenges admiration and respect, whether we agree with his conclusions or not, by the grandeur of his conceptions, and the vigour and exactitude of their execution. Meanwhile his yet greater brother meditates and resolves the simply military problem of conquest; and grappling patiently with the gigantic difficulty of transport, trains himself for his after career in Spain; while, in his subsequent administration of Mysore, he qualifies himself betimes for the hardly less difficult and still more delicate duty of watching over the feeble fortunes of the restored Bourbons in France. Turning to subordinate but not inconsiderable actors in these stirring scenes, I may mention Baird, who, after languishing for years in the gloomy and poisonous dungeons of Mysore, lived to lead the assault in the final storm of Seringapatam; Malcolm, whose boyish aspect excited general surprise, and his geniality not less delight, among the prisoners whom, on their release, he escorted as a subaltern beyond the frontier; and who afterwards broke up, with the same address which distinguished him in later life as a diplomatist, the French contingent in the Nizam's service, previous to the decisive march on Tippoo's capital; and Thomas Monro, who supplies charming narratives and valuable criticisms of some of the operations in these wars, and who, after their termination, made his fame by his settlement of Canara, a portion of the conquered territory.

But while thus the main current of the history rolls

on, many minor and now entirely forgotten episodes occur, which exhibit our countrymen in a very favorable light, and give variety, animation, and excitement to the story, as recorded by contemporary writers. One such episode I have elsewhere endeavoured to make, in some degree, known to a few readers in our own day. But there are many others where the truest heroism was exhibited in humble circumstances; as by the brave and faithful Hoskan, who, after keeping at bay for a while, with a few men in a mountain pass, the whole army of Hyder, led on by one of his ablest generals, disappears in the inevitable carnage, after forwarding the following laconic and hopeful despatch:—

"I expect them again to-morrow morning in two parties with guns; I will take the guns from them with the help of God."

Such, too, were the services of Flint, who again and again, with very inadequate means, repulsed the attacks of Tippoo on Wandewash, and shewed himself as skilful in anticipating the enemy's characteristic stratagems, as he was bold in originally seizing the place by a *tour de force*, closely resembling the capture of Montezuma. Such, again, was the Quixotic but long successful defence of Coimbetoor. Such, above all, were the experiences of the ill-fated prisoners who endured manfully horrors that in the distant retrospect curdle the blood, and produce a ghastly impression akin to that of some vivid nightmare. The records of their sufferings are mostly dispersed in forgotten and crudely concocted monographs. But it will be necessary to disentomb them before a fair estimate can be formed either of the

moving character of even the by-play in Anglo-Mysorean story, or of the grounds and extent of the profound hatred which was entertained at the time by Englishmen against those who thus treated their captive countrymen.

As a mere tale, then, the lives of Hyder and his son are attractive. But they are hardly less instructive. They disclose the constant causes and natural course of political ambition in a turbulent state of society, and a half-barbarous community; the working, partly, without doubt (in such a state of things) for good, but far more for evil, of vigorous and vigilant despotism, unrestrained by a sense of moral obligation to the subject; the constant perils to him who wields it which that despotism involves, and the cruelties and hardening of the ruler's heart which it thereby necessitates; the precise synchronism of Hyder's final victory over his rivals in Mysore, with our own final victory over our great rivals the French in the maritime provinces of the Coromandel Coast; the intricate entanglement of our own fortunes thenceforth with those of the newly-established Mysore dynasty; the internecine character of the strife to which circumstances thus committed us; the inevitableness of a further and not less internecine strife with the Marathas, as the result of our extinction of the power that had hitherto "letted" the duel between ourselves and the great predatory Confederacy for supremacy in the south; the natural history, in a word, of the progress of British rule in the East, with no obscure intimations of many of the indispensable conditions of our success.

And again: the same narrative abounds with delicate and thorny cases of what some would call international law, others simply political morality. It exhibits the representatives of England in India at one time hastening to renounce the independence which they had achieved, and which the puppet Emperor had formally acknowledged; at another openly asserting a hegemonic, if not a strictly paramount authority, in the southern portion of the Peninsula; now, on plausible grounds, evading plain treaty obligations towards a well-disposed ally; now, on grounds equally plausible, incurring the charge of sentimental tenderness towards an humbled but irreconcileably malignant foe; one while incurably deaf to the clearest and oft-repeated warnings of impending hostilities, another while listfully catching the first mutterings of the storm, and averting its force by an overwhelming counterblast; now allowing him whom we had recently stigmatised and made war upon as a usurper, to lord it over ourselves at our very gates; and again, with the stroke of a pen, annihilating for ever the claims of his house, and restoring the line that he had supplanted. Such are some of the conflicts of policy exhibited during the course of a single generation in our relations with Mahometan Mysore. But I need not say that there is a significant and not less inconsistent sequel; and that one of the most recent and successful attempts to do justice to a native potentate of our own creation, and to refurbish our tarnished honor in India, by reversing an arrangement always very questionable, latterly particularly oppressive, has compelled a keen discussion of the character and intention of the

very measure, which restored the Hindoo dynasty to the *musnud* of Mysore.

It is obvious how large and important a field is here opened for the survey of the moral aspects of our rule in India in past times. And without such a survey it is equally obvious that we cannot hope to determine satisfactorily our obligations and conduct at present and in future.

Lastly, the career of Hyder and his son well deserve the attention of the student of strategy, tactics, and military history. Hyder was no mere sturdy soldier, or dashing partisan leader. He was (it seems to me) in quite as true a sense as Clive himself a "heaven-born general." As such his campaigns are well worth study, his system of attack and defence demands, and will repay, analysis. Not less important are the constitution of his motley host, his peculiar mode of training and organization, and the skilful and efficient arrangements by which he provided for equipment, and utilised the resources at once of his own and of his enemies' country.

The secret of his success in a great measure lay in the fact, that he combined the several advantages of the European and the native systems of warfare, and thus triumphed alternately over both peoples. The strangest medley of nationalities was ranged under his banners. Besides his indigenous levies, and the *Chela* battalions, drafted out of the kidnapped population of the lower countries, Marathas, Rajpoots, Affghans, Persians, Arabians, Abyssinians, Indo-Portuguese, French, English, and others, swelled the mass, and varied the complexion

of this incongruous host. But not the less serviceable did they prove in the field; so careful and judicious was their training; so implicit the obedience which was exacted from them. When, in the original Mysore war, the Rajah's and Dulway's troops were employed at Trichinopoly against the English, the Madras Government report upon them as follows:—

"Those of the king of Mysore fill a large space of ground, but it must be to their future courage that they will owe anything that can be said in their favour."

Very different was the condition of things when next the English were called upon to encounter the forces of the same State. The infantry were still far from remarkable, though much improved. But the cavalry, both regular and irregular, were as a whole probably the finest and most efficient body of troopers that any native power had hitherto owned. The *Kuzzaks* beat the Marathas themselves with very inferior numbers; intercepted their communications, pilfered their stores, almost blocked them up in their quarters: and the English soon learned not only to respect but to dread them. While the artillery is admitted by the most competent military critic of these wars not only to have habitually, from superiority of equipment, outmarched our armies, and evaded our pursuit, but to have excelled our own guns, at times, in actual practice in the field. This was no doubt due partially to the presence, and mainly to the training, of Europeans. Still the fact remains, and enhances the interest of the subject, particularly to ourselves. As regards Hyder's careful nursing of his armies at home, I will only now mention, that more

than one of his native biographers is very emphatic on the particular favour and generosity which he habitually extended to *horse-dealers*.

I have already referred to Tippoo's mischievous changes in his father's system of military organization. In the field he followed, in the main, the same plan as Hyder, but with very inferior ability and success. He was certainly a clever tactician, as well as a bold and ferocious combatant; and afforded ample occupation for military abilities which could not be called despicable, at the head of armies generally far superior in numbers and condition to those against which Hyder fought. But *trop gouverner* was, as I have already intimated, his fault throughout. And while he impaired, by his intended reforms, the efficiency of his army directly, he indirectly contributed to the same result, by the frequent and numerous desertions that were the fruit of his general and intolerable tyranny.

The geography of the countries connected with Hyder's history will be described in a later lecture. But it may be well now to trace, very shortly, the rise of the two chief native Powers with whom he came into contact.

The Mahometan dominion in India properly dates from the commencement of the thirteenth century. Mohalib had, soon after the middle of the seventh, first crossed the Indus, and made a raid into the country eastward of that river. Mahmud of Ghazni frequently invaded the northern Provinces; and the

terror of his arms enforced a transitory obedience southward as far as Guzerat. Shahab-u-din established a more regular dominion in Hindostan proper; though the capital of his kingdom being still at Ghazni, his Indian territories could hardly be considered more than an outlying Province. Ala-u-din, just as the thirteenth century was closing, first penetrated into the Dekkan, that is the country south of the river Nerbudda. His successors gradually established their power over a large part of the south; though many provinces remained subject to their original Hindoo rulers, who recognised the supremacy of the Mussulman Sovereign, and paid him tribute; whilst still further south the primeval order of native sovereignty continued undisturbed. In the fourteenth century Mohammed Toghlak, by his capricious tyranny and infatuated violence, sapped the foundations of his extensive Empire; and it broke up never to be reconstructed. While some of the Hindoo principalities which had owned its sway recovered their independence, several powerful Mahometan kingdoms arose out of its ruins.

At the end of the fourteenth century the old cycle began to recur. Timour, like Mahmud of Ghazni, invaded but could hardly be said to have conquered even Northern India. Early in the sixteenth, Baber like Shahab-u-din established an extensive and tolerably regular government in Hindostan. But his son, Humayun, lacking all the father's great qualities except personal bravery, after a feverish dream of empire, the reality of which was little more than an obstinate but ineffectual struggle to counteract the disintegrating

forces around him, was expelled from the country by a representative of one of the old dynasties.

His successful opponent, Shir Shah, a very able and large-minded man, ruled long enough to exhibit a pattern of wise and liberal administration, which was, in a great measure, adopted and further developed by Humayun's son, Acber the Great. Humayun himself, late in life, was restored to a precarious dominion, through the aid of the Persian sovereign, with whom he had taken refuge. But he came back only to die.

Throughout a long and adventurous reign, Acber proved himself the second founder and consolidater of the later—commonly called the Mogul—Empire. Thoroughly realising the peculiar position of himself, his family, and his Mussulman followers in the country, and consequently the indispensable conditions of successful government under such circumstances; and possessing a clearness of head and a warmth of heart which would have done honor to any statesman in any age; he endeavored, like Charlemagne, not only to conquer in the field, but to civilize and secure the affections, or at least the respect, of the conquered; and by a firm, equitable, and tolerant administration, to attach all classes of subjects to his rule; and to blend them eventually into a people as homogeneous as the ineradicable diversities of race, religion, language, and manners would permit. He entered the Dekkan, and annexed Candeish, now the great cotton country; took Ahmednugger, and ruined that kingdom; though its absolute extinction was deferred for thirty years more, when his grandson was on the throne. Acber's two immediate successors observed,

on the whole, the tolerant system which he had sanctioned, though they did not adopt the refined syncretism of his personal creed and religious practices. Occupied with the management of an extensive Empire, and distracted by rebellions and northern expeditions, Jehangir the son, and Shah Jehan the grandson of Acber, nevertheless carried on constant and active wars with the Dekkan princes: but beyond the destruction of the Ahmednugger kingdom, they did not effect any capital change in the political condition of the south.

But the accession of Aurungzib, Shah Jehan's son and supplanter, marks the opening of a new era; the culminating period of the Mogul Empire; the end of the old order in the Dekkan; and the eve of the rise of every state and people, that has since played any important part on the agitated scene of Indian politics.

During his father's reign, Prince Aurungzib had been employed in the Dekkan, and had there shewn his taste and fitness for war. His craft, ambition, unscrupulousness, and religious bigotry, were afterwards notably displayed in the course of the family contest, in which he deposed his father; caused to be murdered, almost without a shadow of pretext, the brother whom he had affected to support as the future Emperor, only for the purpose of smoothing his own path to the throne; overthrew and executed as an unbeliever another brother; and a third being defeated and mysteriously disappearing, Aurungzib assumed, without further opposition, the imperial dignity. He then devoted considerable abilities, and still more remarkable energies, to the accomplishment of two tasks, which, with his character and views,

were not only incompatible, but mutually contradictory —the remodelling and the extension of the Empire. Like his contemporary, Lewis the Fourteenth, he determined to bear hard on dissidents from his own religious system at home, and at the same time to wage unhesitating war against foreign rulers, though of his own creed. Thus he alienated for ever his Hindoo subjects, threw them into rebellion, and lost the cordial support which, under the lenient system inaugurated by Shir Shah, developed by Acber, and substantially retained by his successors, had been hitherto rendered to the Empire by the chivalrous Rajpoot and the fiery Jat. His base thus insecure, he nevertheless persisted in his resolution of conquering the Dekkan. After many years of tedious and indecisive strife, the old Mahometan kingdoms of Bijapoor and Golconda yielded to his arms, and were broken up. But in the course of the prolonged contest, a new and more formidable opponent had arisen in the south. Sivaji, the founder of the Maratha Power, remained to be subdued; and to subdue him, and his people after him, was gradually found to be impossible. Clever, powerful, vigilant, and untiring as was Aurungzib, he failed either to entrap or to hunt down the "mountain rat," as he contemptuously, but not inappropriately, called Sivaji. A more remarkable man than the latter, whom I may almost call the Hindoo Patron Saint of Bandits, it would be difficult to name, or one destined to a more remarkable career. The pride of birth (for on his mother's side he was a Rajpoot); popular sympathy (for his father was a Sudra); national antipathy to the Mogul invaders;

religious antagonism to the persecuting Mahometan; the love of adventure; the love of wealth, especially as a means for securing followers; the craving for dominion, arising partly from his father's high position in the Bijapoor kingdom, partly from his own consciousness of fitness for command; early successes against his own sovereign; hairbreadth escapes and daring and grotesque achievements, multiplied and exaggerated by popular rumor and the fears of his enemies; the enthusiastic attachment and superstitious reverence of his tribesmen and co-religionists, who regarded him not only as a hero, but as a predestined deliverer; all combined to animate him in the strife against an enemy, whom his keen military insight discerned to be, though most imposing and irresistible on the field of regular battle, by no means invulnerable to assaults of a more stealthy and insidious description. His cunning exceeded that even of Aurungzib himself. His activity was so surprising that he seemed ubiquitous. Throughout a whole lifetime spent in incessant toil, anxiety, and peril, he is only recorded to have had one illness. A man of real genius, both for military and administrative pursuits, he reduced predatory warfare to a science; and as the number of his followers increased, he established and enforced among them such prudent and equitable arrangements for the distribution of the plunder, and the regulation of the growing community, that all had an obvious interest in conforming to his dispositions, and executing his commands. The sublime country of the Western Ghats, with its deep recesses, its umbrageous woods, its steep fastnesses, and the rugged and im-

practicable Concan at its base, furnished him with a secure and inaccessible retreat from pursuit, and a constant repository for his spoil; as well as with a race of hardy clansmen on whose fidelity he could implicitly rely, for among them he had been bred, and with their aid had performed his earliest feats. His small but active horsemen, on their lithe ponies, accomplished the most rapid marches with the greatest facility; were capable of the severest privations, and bore them cheerfully, in a service so strictly accordant with their tastes, interests, and prejudices. The stately and pampered Mogul soldiery were perplexed and exhausted in the pursuit of a foe equally formidable and impalpable. Sivaji rarely risked a pitched battle. But the country around the imperial army was systematically devastated; its convoys from Hindostan were repeatedly cut off, and its communications were constantly threatened. And thus while the Emperor and his generals painfully marched and countermarched, stormed detached forts, lorded it in great cities, and were unresisted in the open field, they lived in perpetual fear of imminent starvation. And while defeat was nothing to the Marathas, who dispersed only to reassemble and hover like mosquitos around their baffled victors; the late successes of the Moguls against the Mahometan kings of the Dekkan had aggravated the infliction, by multiplying the swarms of their present antagonists: for, thrown out of employment at Bijapoor and Golconda, the soldiers of those States joined Sivaji in great numbers; while the wretched inhabitants generally, so long interrupted in their peaceful occupations, and afflicted with the manifold and chronic evils of war,

flocked in crowds to a standard which promised them a gainful livelihood, and pungent revenge upon the oppressor.

Thus the South recoiled upon the North; the Gods of the mountains were stronger than the Gods of the plain; Mussulman persecution kindled Hindoo fanaticism; the guerilla leader made successful head against the embattled squadrons of the Empire, under the Great Mogul in person and his choicest generals; the lust of conquest was foiled by the lust of pelf; and the Empire itself was impoverished and debilitated by the protracted struggle.

At length, after twice assuming the emblems of Royalty, once in the Hindoo and again more in the Mogul fashion (thus symbolically indicating his high anti-imperial mission), Sivaji died suddenly. But his spirit still lived in his people; his institutions continued in vigor; and though modified to suit new circumstances, they were developed and matured, until through their operation the heart of the Empire was utterly eaten out.

Sivaji's lineal descendants rapidly degenerated into *rois fainéans*. In the third generation the titular Rajah was kept in close confinement at Satarah. The administration had from the first been confided to Brahmins. One of the great Ministers, the Peishwa, acquired an ascendancy analogous to that of the Merovingian Mayor of the Palace. Uniting Brahmin craft with military abilities, Baji Rao was the real head of the nation, so far as it had one head. His capital was at Poonah, whence he went forth periodically, conquer-

ing and to conquer. But his authority was envied and disputed by another powerful chief of the Bonsla family, whose seat was at Nagpore.

The rivalry of these leading men for some time impaired the strength and arrested the progress of the Confederacy. A little later other families emerged into importance, and their heads became also territorial rulers; the Geikwar in Guzerat, whose chief place was Baroda; Sindia, who gained possession of the strong fortress of Gwalior; and Holcar, whose station was at Indore. Thus the whole Dekkan was overawed and overrun; and Hindostan proper began to be coveted and pervaded by the restless marauders. I have mentioned the principal Maratha capitals (as they have been called) because they shew how completely the Peninsula was cut across, and the territorial integrity of the Empire impaired by their settlements. But throughout their existence as a ruling race, most of these chiefs lived mainly in the open country, not to say on horseback. And their so-called Empire was in substance little more than a loose Confederacy, based upon a very extensive, artfully contrived, and rigorous system of military exaction. The black mail, when paid, was understood to secure exemption from plunder; but the right to levy it was purposely distributed among the chiefs in so complicated a manner, that each could pillage pretty much when and where he pleased, on the plausible ground of distraining for unpaid arrears, of some kind or other.

Thus racked by constant jealousies, and frequently at strife among themselves, the Marathas were other-

wise unanimous and unremitting in prosecuting their conquests, and riveting their fiscal chains, in Province after Province of the devoted Empire. And on many occasions their pretensions were formally ratified in perpetuity by imperial grants; sometimes with a view of staving off immediate insult and invasion, which their attitude portended; at others in the hope of procuring their assistance, or at least their neutrality, when the miserable Emperor, or his minions, or representatives in the Provinces, threatened by some formidable opponent, sought this desperate refuge from what seemed a worse because a more imminent instrument of destruction.

Thus Aurungzib's vigorous but short-sighted policy of combined internal persecution and external conquest had fatally weakened the Empire at the time, and in the end destroyed it. Still he had gained, and his successors professed to retain, a partial and litigious hold over the Dekkan. And the imperial design was, that when the "rebels" (as in the usual language of aggressive conquerors the Marathas were styled) should have been reduced, a Viceroy should rule the whole South, in the interests of the Great Mogul. After Aurungzib's death this Viceroyalty was instituted, and the new officer took the imposing title of Subahdar of the Dekkan. Under him, again, subordinate Mogul functionaries administered the several Provinces comprised in his wide Satrapy, and which had been, in like manner, more or less thoroughly subdued. The most important of these Nabobs, as they were called, was the Deputy of the Carnatic, whose capital was at Arcot,

and whose sway nominally extended from the Kistna to Cape Comorin.

But apart from the resistance, conquests, and extortions of the Marathas, and besides the relaxation and sapping of the imperial system thus caused, another and more internal symptom of decline and approaching dissolution was soon exhibited.

When it is recollected that Nizam-ul-Mulk, whose death is the signal for the commencement of the great dynastic struggles with which Anglo-Indian political history properly begins, served in the armies of Aurungzib, it will be evident that there had been little time for the consolidation of the Dekkan Subahdary with the general fabric of the Empire; and none for the growth of old associations of political unity, and traditionary feelings of attachment to Delhi and the House of Timour. But, moreover, the whole tendency had, in the interval, been in the contrary direction. After the brief authority of more than one transitory predecessor, Chin-Kilich-Khan, otherwise called Azof Jah, or more commonly in Europe Nizam-ul-Mulk, made himself strong in the South, in defiance rather than with the authority of the feeble Emperor: and though he was in a condition to extort a titular delegation of his nominal master's power, he requited the concession by little more than a verbal acknowledgment of that master's sovereignty. His whole character and conduct betokened a steady determination to create for himself and his family a separate and independent Principality. While, like the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, he still insisted on intermeddling with the politics and administration of the Empire; overawed the sovereign and the

ministers; kept up a party at the capital, with his eldest son at the head of it; acted the king-maker; and leagued himself secretly with the foreign sovereign and invader, Nadir Shah, who dealt a more deadly blow at the heart of the agonizing realm, than our own Henry the Fifth at the faction-torn kingdom of France. Thus the Empire was divided against itself, and Nemesis requited anew Aurungzib's ambition, by converting the territory which he had overrun, and the officer who represented his qualified triumph there, into instruments for working out the humiliation and ruin of his descendants.

While Nizam-ul-Mulk pursued his self-seeking and tortuous designs at the expense of his putative sovereign, his own dependent, the Nabob of the Carnatic, faithfully imitated, as far as he was able, the suggestive example. Favored by the constant direction of the Subahdar's eyes northwards, or upon the suspicious proceedings of the Marathas, Sadutoolla prepared the way, by a careful and mild administration, by attaching the most influential persons to his interests, and by occasional territorial acquisitions, for founding in turn a comfortable patrimonial dominion. Nizam-ul-Mulk was as little inclined to tolerate this independence on the part of his inferior, as he was disposed to claim, at least to exercise it himself against the Emperor. But fully employed elsewhere, he long contented himself with the regular receipt of tribute, and with the consciousness that he could stamp out opposition in the Carnatic, whenever it should become absolutely necessary to do so.

But the anomalies involved in the position of this

ambiguous—I had almost said amphibious—personage, did not end here. His relations with the Marathas were various, but throughout characteristic of the man, the time, and the condition of the tottering Empire. On his first appointment to the Dekkan, soon after Aurungzib's death, he tried mild measures with the freebooters, formed friendly connections with some of the chiefs, and played cunningly on their mutual jealousies. Thus he kept them pretty quiet for the time; and he afterwards secured their aid, when the cabals of his rivals summoned him to make a threatening display of force at Delhi. Similar aid, too, was afforded him when, disgusted with the state of things there, he formally revolted, and returning to the south was pursued by the imperial generals.

Perceiving clearly that he must endeavor to keep terms with the Marathas, if he would succeed in his main design, he forbore openly to challenge their claim to *chout*, though he sought to compound for it by a surrender of specific territory. But this not suiting their purpose, which was to have a pretence for perpetual interference and encroachment everywhere, he tried to evade payment by professing inability to decide between the conflicting claimants of the Rajahship. But Baji Rao promptly removed this difficulty: ravaging Azof Jah's territories, and cutting off his supplies, the Peishwa compelled the Mogul to abandon the anti-Rajah, whose cause he had shewn a disposition to favor. Eventually these two able and ambitious servants of degenerate and helpless sovereigns came to terms, and agreed to prosecute, each in his own way, their several

designs against the hapless Empire. Baji Rao began a course of conquest in the North. But Azof Jah's jealousy was aroused, partly by the Peishwa's successes, partly by the private insinuations of the Emperor; who played the pitiful and characteristic game of summoning his Viceroy to confront the Maratha, and at the same time treacherously preparing a further and more irreconcileable quarrel in the South, by making liberal concessions to Baji Rao, at the expense of Nizam-ul-Mulk's provincial territories. The Peishwa, on the whole, had the decided advantage in the field; his opponent's former fire was quenched by age; he acted feebly, and was fain to acquiesce at last in the loss of a further portion of his dominions.

At this crisis it was that Nadir Shah burst into India, instigated (many maintained) by the Subahdar of the Dekkan, in revenge for the Emperor's treatment of himself. Awed for awhile by that terrible visitation, Baji Rao soon reverted to his inveterate practices, and availed himself of Azof Jah's absence at Delhi to invade his rival's dominions. But the Subahdar's second son, Nazir-Jing, well sustained his father's interests. He boldly took the aggressive, broke through the Peishwa's toils, and marched on Poonah. Baji Rao came to terms, and proceeded northward, whether to renew the contest with the father is doubtful; for he soon after died. The confusion of the times, and the personification of that confusion in Azof Jah, are so strikingly exhibited in these incidents, that it seemed worth while thus shortly to notice them.

Between Aurungzib's accession and Azof Jah's death

nearly a century has elapsed. How momentous to the fortunes of India, how characteristic of Oriental society, has been that century! The Great Mogul has been raised to his highest pitch of splendor and pride; has yearned for other realms to conquer; and has found victory but the prelude of defeat, and rash extension the sure and active cause of disaster, feebleness, and decay. The Empire is now a fast-vanishing quantity in the political arithmetic of India; though the shadow long outlasts the substance, and lends a delusive sanction to proceedings that belong in reality to a new order of things. But, what is now to be that new order? The question is a perplexing one for the daring prophet, who would cast the horoscope of the several possible aspirants to the sovereignty that is passing into abeyance. The Maratha roams freely over the whole Peninsula; rules as a domiciliated chieftain in large districts; awes the nations by the rapidity of his movements, the artfulness of his devices, the insulting and exacting lordliness of his pretensions. The Abdalli, indeed, is appointed to chastise him, and humble his pride, before the world is many years older. Yet his power is destined long to outlast the disastrous day of Paniput, and to threaten universal anarchy by the gradual resolution of society into a vast cluster of rival gipsy camps. The Subahdar, on the uplands of the Dekkan, has founded a great house, established a powerful state, accumulated vast treasures, and trained his family in the emulous school of ambition. The lessons of the dying warrior and schemer will certainly not be lost on his posterity. But who is now to take up his

difficult part, and carry forward his soaring banner? Below the Eastern Ghats, fast by the surf-lashed shore of Coromandel, a man of rare genius from the far West is already meditating the subjection of the native Powers to the authority of France. England, meanwhile, is rearing on the same coast a genius of a different though kindred character, to counteract the Frenchman's plots. But who could have foreseen, that from the petty principality of Mysore should shortly emerge a hero, who by the spontaneous energy of his nature, and the skilful combination of craft and force, of Eastern and Western resources and appliances, should become the foremost and most masterful man in the South? And after the collapse of French ambition, should found a mighty kingdom, out-manœuvre the Maratha, vilipend the Nizam, and dictate peace to the English at the gates of Madras?

LECTURE II.

THE History of British India is, from the nature of the case, a peculiarly complicated story. The growth of the Company, and the character of its early trade; the progress of our arms, and the development of local administration; the quarrels, blunders, violence, engendered in a remote sphere by the novelty of the situation, the low tone of the age, and the plausible pretexts of great emergencies and the public good; the stormy meetings and ambiguous policy of Leadenhall-street, and the efforts of Statesmen and Parliament to enlighten and control the great Confederacy of Merchant Princes; the character of Governors-General, and their dealings with the community immediately under their rule, or with the native states beyond it; the physical, social, and political peculiarities to which the extension of our Empire gradually introduces us; the master minds and typical leaders among the natives, who anxiously scan our progress and court our alliance, or enter the lists against us; the philanthropic achievements of distinguished officials, and the exertions of tolerated but unofficial missionaries:—such and other topics as miscellaneous, crowd on the attention, and demand alternate treatment.

However interesting each of these subjects may be, they form so complex and at first sight so incongruous a whole, and require so much space, if the genuine outlines even are to be brought out with life and force,

that a busy world, intent on its own more immediate concerns and more familiar studies, has little disposition to ramble so far a-field in search of what after all may prove an occupation more laborious than entertaining, and a seed-plot of thorny controversies, rather than a storehouse of useful facts, and an exhibition of the working of intelligible principles.

This is one of the many reasons that might be assigned for the strange ignorance and apathy which Macaulay complained prevailed, forty years ago, as to our Eastern Empire and its origin. The intervening generation, in spite of all that has since occurred to quicken the interest of the community at home in Indian affairs, has not outdated the great historian's remark. Few intelligent and educated Englishmen, who are not destined for the East, care to know more of Dupleix, Clive, and Warren Hastings, than is told in the very brilliant but not very circumstantial Essays, in one of which the complaint occurs.

Yet indifference to the history of our Eastern possessions cannot be laid to the score of this University. For, besides the institution of the office which I have the honor of holding, a Statute was some years ago passed, enabling Selected Candidates for the Indian Civil Service to substitute the History of British India for that of the Mother Country, in the Pass School of Law and Modern History. But, moreover, some years before that Statute was passed, and soon after the establishment of the School, all Candidates for Honors in History were authorised to offer as one of their subjects The Rise of the British Empire in India. It

is neither difficult to understand, nor necessary here to point out, why the latter invitation has not been very often accepted: nor need I now stop to argue that it was worth accepting. It will be evident on consideration, that the portion of the history suggested for study is at least free from many of the difficulties connected with the later periods of the same story. While the codified notice issued three years ago—the Perpetual Edict of the School—limits the student's attention to a small and comparatively simple part of the whole subject. The Rise of the British Empire in India, "to be read in Orme," is actually little more than the Anglo-French warfare in the Carnatic, and Clive's Conquest of Bengal, with a fragmentary account of his rule there. And though this includes events of the deepest interest and of some technical obscurity, and well admits of illustration and comment, yet the nature of the interest is, on the surface at least, almost entirely military, and the course of events is rarely interrupted by administrative details: while Parliamentary interference has not begun, and many other matters that are prominent in the pages of the historian of later times are as yet unthought of. Thus the subject assumes proportions manageable by the student, and naturally resolves itself into two distinct series of occurrences, each series evolved in a singularly dramatic manner, the southern struggle especially forming one long and absorbing tragedy.

That tragedy consists of two parts, with a comparatively unimportant interlude. Dupleix's career gives unity to the first, Lally's to the second part. Dupleix conceives the bold and dazzling design of establish-

ing the ascendancy of the French in the South, a preliminary step to its extension over the whole of India. In the Dekkan he succeeds completely, for there Bussy is his agent. But in the Carnatic he is foiled by the unexpected heroism of Clive, the good sense and steady attitude of Saunders, the military ability of Lawrence, and the spirited and long-continued defence of Trichinopoly. He is at length recalled in disgrace; and the issue remains undecided. Mahomet Ally and the English are left masters of the Carnatic. But Bussy is still supreme in the Dekkan; and France retains her rich possessions around Masulipatam. After an interval, in which Clive has in Northern India accomplished what Dupleix had meditated in the South, Lally, in a temper very different from both, undertakes the task of expelling us from the Peninsula. Intemperate, overbearing, and unsympathetic, he commits at the outset the fatal mistake of abandoning the Dekkan connexion; and deserted also by the French fleet, is compelled to fight *en l'air*. Yet he conquers at first; struggles throughout most gallantly; but is eventually obliged to succumb to adverse circumstances, and the genius of Coote. Pondicherry falls; and the French Power in India is extinguished for ever.

To enhance the interest of so eventful a story, and justify the vulgar idea of tragedy, the chief actors in each case, on the side of our enemies, perish almost simultaneously at home:—Dupleix, there is too much reason to fear, from actual starvation; Lally on the scaffold!

To found and to lose a French Empire in the East is equally perilous. But the Company which has mal-

treated its master-spirit does not long survive his extinction. And, before many years are over, Lally Tollendal's revolutionary eloquence fans the flame which consumes the Government that murdered his father!

Such, in a few words, are the character and course of this memorable contest. I propose, during the present term, to confine myself to its earlier stage. It may be well here to indicate rather more fully, though very summarily, the nature and connexion of the events which this comprises.

Dupleix succeeds to the government of Pondicherry at a most critical moment. Having resuscitated and greatly stimulated the French commerce in Bengal, and enriched himself and his associates with the legitimate and permitted gains of private traffic, he finds the Southern settlement in imminent danger of capture and ruin, from the breaking out of war between England and France in Europe, and the presence in his neighbourhood of a powerful English fleet. With much address he persuades the native ruler of the province to forbid hostilities on land between the Europeans in his dominions. Thus Pondicherry is for the time saved. He then applies himself with indefatigable energy to speed the equipment and the arrival on the coast of a French expedition from the Mauritius. Labourdonnais appears; the English armament, after some indecisive operations, vanishes; and Madras falls. But the jealous and insubordinate spirit of the Admiral seeks to rob the Governor-General of the solid fruits of victory[a]; and to

[a] This, of course, is not Orme's version; but I hope to make it good as I proceed.

stultify his policy of repressing the English, by admitting the town to ransom. Baffled by the firmness and vigilance of Dupleix, he leaves the coast with a lie on his lips—that the treaty of redemption had been ratified at Pondicherry. But the Governor-General formally declares the convention void, and treats the town as prize of war. A new opponent now enters the field. The native Prince who had before befriended him, more consistent than the ambitious ruler of Pondicherry, disapproves the extension of French dominion; is pacified at first by a promise that Madras shall be given up to himself; but finding no likelihood of this promise being kept, prepares to seize the place by force. His son with a large army sits down before it, and commences a siege in form. Then suddenly and appallingly flashes forth the superiority of European over native arms. The assailants are ignominiously repulsed; the siege is raised in dismay; and Dupleix has leisure to plot against the other English settlements. Four times he attempts the capture of Fort St. David or of its outlying town, Cuddalore, by a *coup de main*. But the carelessness of the French officer in command of the expedition, the elements, the wariness of the English General, and the arrival of an English fleet, successively baffle him.

The British again muster in overwhelming force; and the siege of Pondicherry is in turn undertaken. But the Admiral's unfitness for conducting such an enterprise on shore, bad engineering, ignorance of the locality, the approach of the stormy season, and the wise precautions and heroic spirit of the Governor, cause

this great and confident force to miscarry disgracefully. The sound of Dupleix's triumphant *Te Deums* has hardly died away, when peace is proclaimed between the nations, and Madras is restored to the English. Thus ends the first Act.

The second opens with the death of the most august personage of Southern India—the oldest, the most celebrated, and the most independent of the Mogul Viceroys, Nizam-ul-Mulk. While the English are indemnifying themselves for their late failure by making unprovoked war on the King of Tanjore, a tripartite alliance has been concluded between three daring adventurers, Mirzapha Jing, a young claimant of the Dekkan throne, Chunda Saheb, a veteran warrior and intriguer, who aspires to supplant the ruler of the Carnatic, and the French Governor-General, whose aims, if less definite, are certainly not less extensive than those of his confederates. French gallantry and skill again decide the day; and the Nabob of Arcot is slain. But a more formidable enemy of the allies is at hand. The nephew has sought to supplant the uncle in the Dekkan. But that uncle, Nazir Jing, appears with a countless host; the English join him; and at the most critical moment the French officers basely desert their post; and Dupleix's contingent, the flower of the allied army, is compelled to retreat in haste to Pondicherry. With it goes the Pretender to the Nabobship of Arcot; but the inexperienced claimant of the Dekkan Viceroyalty is deluded into throwing himself upon his uncle's mercy, and is instantly and perfidiously put in fetters.

The triumph of Nazir Jing is however short.

The French recover from their disorder, and seize the strongest fortress in the Carnatic. Their enemy's nobles are discontented. Dupleix, anticipating Clive in Bengal, intrigues with them and inflames their discontent. They conspire against their master; and while the French are contending against the faithful part of his army, he is murdered by one of the conspirators. Then his imprisoned rival is produced; saluted as Viceroy; proceeds to Pondicherry; is entertained there with Oriental pomp; constitutes Dupleix his Deputy for all the wide region south of the river Kistna; showers upon him favor, distinctions, and territorial cessions; and the success of the Frenchman's great game is commemorated on the pillar of Dupleix, and by the foundation of the city of *Dupleix-Futteabad.* But another storm is already brewing. The nobles who have slain the uncle, dissatisfied with the price of blood, destroy the nephew on his homeward march, and are themselves cut off in the struggle. All is again confusion and dismay. The fortune of France, however, is still in the ascendant. Bussy's authority commands general confidence, and promptly restores order. Another puppet is substituted, and ratifies the concessions made by his predecessor to his European patrons; and the march towards the Dekkan is quietly resumed. Thus ends the second Act.

In the third Chunda Saheb is matched against Mahomet Ally, a son of the slaughtered ruler of the Carnatic and the English candidate. Slow to espouse his cause, our countrymen are at length roused by commercial jealousies to lend him some assistance. But

the dazzling successes of Dupleix have cowed their spirit; their leaders are irresolute, their soldiers timid; and the Anglo-native army, after fighting a battle in which the Oriental proves bolder than the European, retires hastily and discreditably behind the walls of Trichinopoly. The Carnatic is overrun by the enemy; Trichinopoly itself seems on the point of falling; when Clive's heroic defence of Arcot, and his subsequent triumphs in the field, and politic destruction of Dupleix's vaunting column, infuses new life into our troops, and daunts their opponents. Lawrence re-appears on the scene; the two friends successfully relieve the beleaguered city; hem in the besiegers in turn; demolish the force which Dupleix's unremittiug exertions have pushed to the rescue; and compel the whole army to surrender. The Act closes with the melancholy fate of the French candidate, who is treacherously murdered by the general of a native power in alliance with England.

Thus the Carnatic Tragedy seems complete; and Dupleix's part in that quarter of India played out. But it is not so. The folly and perfidy of Mahomet Ally, whom we may now call the Nabob, involves himself and us in a new and more desperate war; in which we are assailed by the combined forces of the Mysoreans, the Marathas, and the French. Again the strife rages far and wide; but the engrossing interest once more centres in Trichinopoly. Craft seeks to surprise the city; but is quietly detected and foiled. A vast host is in vain employed to starve it out; to overpower its defenders in the field; and to take it by escalade.

Again and again, with most inferior numbers, the English triumph in pitched battles; secure the arrival of their convoys; overawe the enemy; and under Lawrence and officers trained in the school of Clive, accomplish the most decisive results with the most inadequate means. But decisive for the moment only. Still the weary siege lags on; and Dupleix's spirit does not quail. At length the picked men of the English are cut off in an encounter memorable as the first great occasion of Hyder Ally's renown. But another great victory consoles the English; who drive their opponents backward from the city to the verge of the island, where the fate of the former army had been sealed. At this interesting moment the curtain abruptly falls on the vexed scene. Dupleix is recalled, and a pacification is announced.

The fifth Act, though equally eventful, and abrupt in its transitions, I will forbear to sketch; partly to save time, partly because it lies in a country remote from the Carnatic. There is a stricter unity and continuity in the other transactions, which would be impaired by entering now on events unconnected with them in place, and wrought out by an almost entirely different set of actors. But perhaps enough has been said to shew how interesting, even as a mere story, is the history of Dupleix's administration. The deeper interest arising out of the political and moral problems which it suggests, I shall endeavor to indicate in the final lecture.

The great country which we call India is frequently discriminated by the natives into Hindostan and the Dekkan. In this sense Hindostan comprises vaguely all to the north, the Dekkan all to the south, of the renowned river Nerbudda—the Loire of India. At other times each term has a much more restricted application. With Hindostan, in either sense, we have at present no concern. But it is desirable to state now that the Dekkan proper denotes the high table-land bounded by the Sautpura mountains on the north, and on all other sides by the chain of the Ghats. This chain, sweeping round the territory of Mysore, culminates at the Neelgherries. Beyond these lies a lower region, running east and west from coast to coast, and called the Gap of Coimbetore. Then the Peninsula, as it narrows to a point, rises once more, and like the Cornish Highlands, becomes a continuous ridge in the centre, sloping seaward on either side. Thus the Dekkan, in the narrower sense, excludes not only all south of the Neelgherries, but the long maritime plain on either side of the Peninsula. Our present business is entirely with a portion of the Eastern plain. But it may be well to notice one or two circumstances of wider range, which have primarily affected both the geography and the history of the Carnatic.

The Western Ghats are loftier than the Eastern, and the general slope of the land between them is eastward. Hence the great rivers rise in the western hills, and cutting their way in deep channels through the table-land, carry down the eastern declivities plentiful *débris* from the higher country. Hence a complete and remarkable contrast between the lower verges and the

coasts of the Peninsula on the two sides. In the west, the plain is uniformly narrow, mostly, in its southern portion at least, uneven, and in many places cannot be called a plain at all, being little more than the rugged spurs and contorted basements of the mountains, intersected by precipitous torrents and frequent estuaries[b]. In the east, on the contrary, the rivers have gradually formed by their deposits a spacious and comparatively level alluvial plain, broken into rambling and protuberant deltas at each river mouth. Hence the fertility of such regions as Tanjore and Masulipatam. But hence also the absence of good harbours. The rivers are obstructed by bars; and this is the more serious as (I presume from the projection of the deposits into the sea, and the consequent shallowness of the water in shore) a formidable surf runs along the coast, and makes landing at all times difficult and dangerous.

Both this plain and the Dekkan proper, in spite of the rivers, are naturally well adapted for the operations of cavalry, unlike the crabbed Province of Canara, on the opposite coast. There "armies whole have sunk," in the effort to employ horses, where nature has placed barriers against their use. And though the Eastern Ghats are steep, they are pierced with so many passes, that they are readily accessible to the same arm. Thus, geographically speaking, the Carnatic at all times invited the incursions of the Marathas, as in after years those of Hyder, and his still more formidable *Kuzzaks*.

The scene of the events which I propose to trace

[b] This rugged region seems to correspond to the lower range or "undercliff" of the Eastern mountains, such as the Province of Baramahl.

lies almost exclusively in the middle region of the alluvial plain; that is, from Madras to Trichinopoly and Tanjore, or, in other words, in or on the confines of the Province of Arcot. The term Carnatic is also, it must be explained, ambiguous; and is used, according to circumstances, in the three following senses. In contra-distinction to the remoter parts of the Peninsula, where the English and other European nations had settlements, e.g. Bengal and the western coast, it serves as a general name for the whole lower country comprised between the Coromandel Coast and the Eastern Ghats; from the small river Gundigama to Cape Comorin. And this sense of the word is based upon the fact, that the Nabob of Arcot, or of the Carnatic, as he was more properly styled, was assumed to be entitled to the obedience of the petty princes further south, and to levy from them the imperial tribute. But in a second and narrower sense, the name is restricted to the Province immediately under the government of the same functionary; in which sense the Carnatic commences at the river Pennar and ends at the river Cavery, or rather at its northern branch the Coleroon. But natives habitually gave a wider extension even than the former to the term, and made it include a large district on the table-land above the eastern mountains. The latter district was distinguished as the Carnatic Bala-Ghat; the plain land as the Carnatic Payen Ghat; that is, the parts above and below the Ghat range, respectively. It will not be necessary now to employ the word in this last sense.

Though the face of the country in the Arcot Province

was mostly open and pretty even, several circumstances there tended to interfere seriously with warlike operations. Besides the courses of the great rivers, and of the smaller streams into which they diverged, and the swampy regions that lay around their mouths, the cultivation of rice requiring frequent irrigation, much of the land was apt to be flooded even during the drier season; and the numerous water-courses which were used for this purpose impeded still further the movement of troops. On the other hand the *nullahs* when dry, were often employed as lurking-places, or for defence in action.

But again, the heat of the climate, and especially the fierce glare of the tropical sun, together with the frequent difficulty of obtaining pure water, and the temptation to drink the stagnant and fetid substitute which first came to hand, proved most noxious to Europeans, and produced deadly diseases. In our last war with Hyder we hear of a hundred men being smitten with sunstroke on the first day's march from Madras. And the same writer who records this fact tells us, that thrice that number were soon after laid up with dysentery and other ailments, in a single regiment, from drinking foul water in the course of a hot march. To this must be added a commissariat difficulty which beset the Europeans long after this time—the want of an adequate supply of transport bullocks; an evil which increased when the army quitted the neighbourhood of the coast, and the cunning and timid natives inland secreted their grain, and drove off their cattle into fortified holds, or places of concealment in the woods and

hills. There seems to have been much jobbery, too, among the native transport officers, who provided unserviceable beasts, or playing into the hands of the enemy, reported as disabled those which were really serviceable; and made a double profit out of the transaction, by privately selling them to the native agents for the supply of meat.

The hardy and dashing Maratha cavalry, simple in their wants, though insatiable in their demands, and artistically skilful in exploring hidden stores, had a great advantage in this respect over the clumsier native troops, and still more over the European infantry and sepoys: European cavalry hardly yet existed in India.

But the most serious impediment to warfare on the mainland, and a total obstacle to maritime enterprises, was the Monsoon. This prevails, on the Coromandel Coast, from about October to December. It is ushered in generally by gales and thunderstorms of appalling violence: it swells the rivers with surprising rapidity and volume; fills the deep channels of the water-courses; and reduces the country variously to a lake or a morass. The comfortless chilliness of this dreary season, the effect of constant wind and an all-pervading atmosphere of moisture, alternating with capricious bursts of fiery sunshine, can only be appreciated by those who have felt it; and is a most trying experience, whether to a native or to a European constitution. Harbourless, and threatened by the raging surf that rolls ever on these shores, and most fiercely at such a time, the fleets were compelled to quit the coast and seek shelter at a distance, before the Monsoon broke; or to remain at the risk of

being beaten to pieces at their anchorage in the open roadsteads, or to brave the perils of the mid ocean at its wildest season. Thus the settlers were left to themselves and their own resources during a quarter of the year; unaided by that branch of the service on which they so much depended for their military efficiency, and even for their existence in the country of their exile.

The Province of Arcot was thickly studded with fortresses and fortified towns, the growth of a period of insecurity and violence, and which rendered the thorough reduction and pacification of the country tedious and difficult. As in the feudal ages, each commandant or *killedar* was apt to hold out in his petty fastness, until he was intimidated, bribed, or betrayed into surrender, or actually stormed. Frequently a verbal recognition of allegiance, or the payment of a contribution, enabled him to avoid opening his gates to a titular ruler, or a struggling pretender, at once weak, needy, and pressed by more important military calls elsewhere. Sometimes the governor frankly avowed himself a "waiter upon Providence," and declined to admit either of the belligerents, until a battle should have enlightened him on the knotty point of the relative strength of their claims to an obedience which, in the abstract, he did not dispute. Such warfare occupies much space in Orme's detailed narrative; but may generally be passed over in these lectures without scruple. It may here be added that these minor forts were mostly rude square constructions, with or without ditches if on level ground, but where possible built on an elevation. Adjoining was a village or *pettah*, with a weak mud wall, but no

parapet; and commanded in all cases by the blundering and old-fashioned artillery of the fort.

The social consequences of this frequency of fortresses were, during the troubled times now to be entered on, very analogous to those described by the Saxon Chronicler as resulting from the castles in the reign of Stephen. Each commandant fought and marauded really on his own account, though generally in the name of one or other candidate for the Nabobship: and while thus the people suffered cruelly, the difficulty of provisioning the regular armies was greatly increased. Sometimes, grown bold by impunity, these equivocal partisans infested the skirts of those armies; besieged forts held in the interests of one or other of the contending parties; or sought to pillage a temple, whose tributary offerings were counted on for supplying an indirect fund for the main war. Still wilder chieftains, or *poligars*, from the woods that fringed the frontier of the Province, added their incursions: while disbanded soldiers, deserters, flying Maratha parties, and *colleries*, or irregular and savage skirmishers, whose only weapon was a long spear, and their chief acquirement extreme address in "cattle-lifting," combined (as the Madras Government once expressed it) to "peel the country to the bones."

Some of the places of greater size and strength it will be necessary to describe hereafter. Now I will only mention Arcot, the political importance of which was as considerable as its walls were weak; close to it Velore, notable as the appanage of Mortiz Ally, a man whose birth, wealth, and ambition more than once led him to snatch at a dignity, of which his crimes, timidity,

and avarice as often deprived him; and who nevertheless continued almost independent until the extinction of the French Power, and the final establishment of Mahomet Ally's supremacy, under English protection; Gingee, in the centre of the Province, a mountain-girdled trilateral, three separate fortresses on distinct hills connected with a wall—a place which natives deemed impregnable, but which soon after the opening of the present wars, the French stormed (as we did afterwards the terrible "Hill of Death" Savern-droog) in a single assault, and held until after Lally's surrender; lastly, nearer Arcot, Wandewash, where the decisive battle was fought between that leader and Coote; and which, when Hyder afterwards overran the Carnatic, was, thanks to the heroism and sagacity of Flint, one of the very few places that did not fall into the hands of the Mysorean.

But there was another class of buildings, the peaceful object and warlike aptitudes of which again recal the Anglo-Norman age, and the use and abuse of its architecture in the troubles of the time. The spacious Pagodas were well suited and constantly employed for military purposes. Some of the most famous and touching associations connected with the progress of our arms in India cluster round the names of such edifices. The most terrible reverse we ever experienced in the East, previous to the Affghan disasters, the destruction of Colonel Baillie's corps by Hyder Ally and Tippoo, took place within sight of "The Spire of Conjeveram," and owing to the unwillingness of the Commander-in-Chief to abandon his advanced base there. And throughout

the sieges of Trichinopoly, which occupy so much space in the present wars, the seven walled temple of Seringham[c], and the adjoining Pagoda of Jumbakishna, were generally the head-quarters of the besiegers.

In attempting to give a short account of the local circumstances affecting the conduct of these wars, it may be well to say a few words on three other artificial features of the country, the *choultries*, the tanks, and the roads. The last, in the absence of more definite information, may be dismissed with the remark, that they seem to have been numerous and good—for the East at least—and that in the lower lands, where the effects of the Monsoon were felt most strongly, and where rice was grown, elevated causeways traversed the parts chiefly exposed to natural or artificial inundation. The *choultries* were of two kinds. The larger were a sort of caravanserais, occurring for the convenience of travellers at intervals along the high roads; answering to the "travellers' bungalows" of our own time in India, and to the "rest houses" in the desert between Cairo and Suez, in the days of the "vans" and before the railway was introduced there. With these we have now no concern. But there was a smaller class of buildings which bore the same name, and which abounded both

[c] This Pagoda is thus described by Orme:—"It is composed of seven square inclosures, one within the other, the walls of which are 25 ft. high and 4 thick. These inclosures are 350 ft. distant from one another, and each has four large gates with a high tower, which are placed, one in the middle of each side of the inclosure, and opposite to the four cardinal points. The outward wall is near four miles in circumference, and its gateway to the south is ornamented with pillars, several of which are single stones 33 ft. long, and nearly five in diameter; and those which form the roof are still larger: in the inmost inclosure are the chapels."

in towns and in the country. A long and shallow edifice, walled behind and on both sides, but open in front, where however a colonnade of simple pillars supported the roof, was often found to be, when extemporaneously loopholed, and sometimes entrenched, a very convenient *point d'appui* for infantry in the stress of an engagement; especially when the brunt of the battle so constantly fell upon a very small number of Europeans, or even of Sepoys, liable to be surrounded and cut up by swarms of active cavalry.

The tanks also were of two kinds. But here, again, it is with the smaller description only that we are concerned. Smaller comparatively, for they are often of great size. They are originally deep excavations of a square or oblong shape, with a graduated descent to the bottom along the whole extent of each side. A level interval of some breadth is left at the surface, and the whole is surrounded by a wall. Thus is provided a ready-made entrenchment, with a platform and an ample receptacle for large numbers of men. For towards the end of the fair season these tanks often become nearly dry; and neglect and disuse not unfrequently leave them entirely so. In this condition they were particularly convenient for an ambuscade. But they were a dangerous resource, on account of the difficulty of suddenly quitting a position so unfavorable when assailed by a daring enemy. Thus Clive owed one of his great victories not a little to his having attacked unexpectedly a body thus placed, and poured a smart fire from over the walls on both flanks at once, before the inmates could emerge from a trap that they had laid, only to be

themselves taken in it. And in the battle of Wandewash a shell exploding in such a tank full of troops, killed and wounded eighty men, and put the rest to flight.

Perhaps it ought to be added, that though the time had not come for the English to experience the difficulties and dangers of campaigning in the mighty forests and dense jungles, that in later days impeded their operations, and endangered their rising *prestige:* yet their first short war in Tanjore, and the slaughter of their best men by the Marathas and Mysoreans shortly before Dupleix was recalled, impressed them with a full sense of this danger. Nor must it be forgotten that the groves, or *topes* as they are called in India, which are scattered over the face of the Arcot province, were, of course, constantly turned to account in the course of the contest there.

Such was the general character of the Province as a theatre of war. The settlements of the Europeans were all on the coast. Besides Pondicherry and Madras, Cobelong belonged to the French; Fort St. David, with its suburb Cuddalore, to the English; while, further south, the former had Karical; and the acquisition of Devi-Cotah by the latter it will be my business to relate. The Dutch also held Negapatam and other places. When Dupleix was contending with Nazir Jing, he made himself master by force of Masulipatam, and obtained the formal cession of it, in return for the services of the French contingent, from Nazir's successors. All the settlements in the Province of Arcot were fortified in the European fashion. Dupleix added a sea-wall at Pondicherry; and a hedge of prickly cactus, interspersed

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with redoubts, skirted the old limits of the French territory there, and formed an outer circuit of defence, especially against cavalry.

The fortifications of Madras were originally weak; but were much improved by the French while the place was in their hands. Fort St. David was considered a model work; but it was on a very small scale, and though it escaped the irregular attacks of Dupleix, it fell almost without a blow when besieged by Lally. It appears to have been, in fact, rather a fancy fortress than one calculated for serious defence. There was not even space on the ramparts to work the guns properly. At each of these places a river ran into the sea, and was employed in completing the defences. At Pondicherry the town was entirely enclosed by the fortifications. At Madras the Europeans only had this advantage; though one native quarter, the Black Town, had some slight works; which was also the case at Cuddalore, on the opposite side of the river to Fort St. David.

The proximity of these settlements towards each other, and the jealousies produced by their commercial antagonism, fostered a constant tone of mutual suspicion, and gave an intensity, a vivacity, and an unappeasableness to their hostilities, which recal the fierce and inveterate malignity of the petty Greek communities in ancient times, or of the rival Italian republics in the middle ages. The dragon's teeth were sown in the act of establishing the factories, and matured in the process of trading with the natives. And as the superior prosperity of the English commerce seems first to

have incited Dupleix's attempts to rival it, and then to have prompted the bolder course of seeking gain, through the acquisition of political influence; so our countrymen's dread of that influence being employed for the purpose of imposing prohibitive duties on their articles of traffic, if not of expelling them directly from the country, roused them to action, and embittered the strife.

To commercial jealousy was added the traditional enmity of the nations, which had been much aggravated since the factories had been first planted. For then Spain had long been the common foe; but Lewis the Fourteenth's reign had intervened, and the old mediæval feeling had revived, not to diminish until our own, in that respect at least, happier days. Yet this feeling was kept in check at first by the awe of the "Country Powers," which at the beginning of the period now before us was great; until the collapse of regular government in the neighbourhood, and the pronounced superiority of Europeans in the field, turned the deferential traders into active partizans of the contending factions, and determined though technically indirect opponents of each other.

Their misgivings as to the light in which their warfare would be regarded at home also hampered them. Thus leagued with the natives, they confronted each other in the field at first charily; were as punctiliously observant of an insincere etiquette which assumed their mutual friendliness, as polite duellists who shake hands to prove their cordiality just before shooting each other; and exchanged diplomatic complaints of reci-

procal acts of violence, that were obviously only economical statements, and were ludicrously inapplicable to actual circumstances.

It will be observed that the first was strictly a European and a coast war. The French and the English fought as principals, on a quarrel between the Crowns at home; and indecisive sea-fights and mutual attacks on the settlements were the sole operations, except the notable episode in which the French repulsed the Nabob's forces at Madras, and were afterwards roughly handled in return near Fort St. David. But short as it was, the first Act (as I have ventured to call it) in the Dupleix Drama clearly exhibited one essential and marked feature of the whole piece—the absolute dependence of the factories on a maritime and extra-Indian base; and consequently the precariousness of their position, and the abrupt and extreme vicissitudes in the fortunes of the strife. Everything turns on the fleets; their presence or absence, their relative strength, the superior boldness of one or other Admiral in remaining on the coast or returning promptly thither, and braving the opening or the closing commotions of the Monsoon; the number and quality of the recruits whom the ships import, or of the marines and sailors whom they leave behind them. This circumstance, it will hereafter appear, is all-important in estimating Dupleix's general policy.

Elsewhere in India the English had factories, and little more, at Calcutta, Tellicherry, Surat, and a few other spots. They possessed, moreover, the large and fertile island of Bombay, whence, in the preceding century, they had waged war, with various fortune, against

both the Portuguese and the natives. But little help now came altogether from these remote and not very martial places. The French, again, had, on the western coast, the small settlement of Mahé, and in Bengal the larger and more important one of Chandernagore, the scene of Dupleix's previous labours as local governor. But they also owned the island which we call Mauritius, and the two adjoining ones, Bourbon and Rodriguez; the two former of which Labourdonnais had reclaimed, and advanced to a very flourishing condition. Ceylon afforded a harbour, which though belonging to neither party but to the Dutch, was frequented in turn by the hostile fleets. But it was to "The Islands" that the French, and to the spacious and beautiful haven of Bombay that the English, mostly resorted during the Monsoon.

When the Europeans began to take part in the quarrels of the natives, and the theatre of war was transferred to the interior of the country, their dependence on help from abroad was hardly diminished; especially as neither French nor English could command any secure resource inland. The distracted and spoliated state of the Arcot Province has been already noted. Food and other necessaries collected at the sword's point, and occasional money payments supplied by party zeal or timidity, or extorted by force, in lieu of the regular revenues due to Government, were totally inadequate to the heavy cost of the war on either side. Dupleix's Dekkan contingent indeed paid, or rather enforced the payment of, its own expenses; but for the time it did little more. Thus, contrary to express

covenant, the burden of equipping and maintaining their own, not to say their allies' troops, fell, in a great degree, upon the Europeans. The countries to the south of the Coleroon, which were technically dependent upon the Nabob of the Carnatic, were laid under severe and incessant contributions of men and provisions. And out of the wealthy State of Tanjore the French and their candidate wrung some money. But such resources were too limited, too occasional, and too much dependent upon the wavering estimate formed by the tributary as to the relative strength of the rivals, for any efforts to be spared, which could facilitate at head-quarters the sustenance of an army so liable otherwise to be starved in the field. The Mysoreans supported themselves, and seem to have assisted Mahomet Ally, on one occasion at least, with a large sum of money. But their general worthlessness as soldiers, and the ravages of their irregulars, probably made them, on the whole, a greater burden than benefit to either party. The Marathas had a knack of securing payment from two quarters at once; and in addition enriched themselves by robbing on their own account amongst friends and foes indiscriminately.

The stress of the war converging after a time almost entirely to Trichinopoly, the large and fertile island of Seringham, over against that city, became an object of vital interest in a commissariat point of view. But it was too often in the hands of the enemy for the English to profit much by it; and proved, on the other hand, quite unable to support the vast host that the besiegers planted upon it.

The great river Cavery, after washing the banks of another island and the walls of another fortress, where the fortunes of England in the East were to be decided at a later day, sweeps down from the table-land into the Carnatic plain, and branches after a time into two main channels—the Coleroon on the north—the southern stream retaining the original name. The long and straggling tongue of land between these channels, before they diverge at a wide angle, is the Island of Seringham. On this island were the two Pagodas already mentioned. And the town of Trichinopoly stood on the mainland, a little to the south, pretty nearly at the apex of the triangle formed by the Delta of the Cavery and its branches. The topography of this famous place must be elsewhere more particularly explained. But it may be now mentioned, that while not far removed from Mysore on the west, the territory of Trichinopoly abutted eastwards on that of the Rajah, or as we called him, the King of Tanjore, whose dominions were almost conterminous with the Delta. This was a region of exuberant fertility, the scene of much industrial and commercial activity, and hence the emporium of much wealth. Originally attacked by the English, and despoiled of the important coast-station Devi-Cotah; then besieged in his capital and heavily mulcted by the French and Chunda Saheb; plied simultaneously and incessantly by the overtures and local agents of both parties, and probably hating both with impartial cordiality; the timid and vacillating Rajah at first contented himself with allowing free passage through his territories to both. But he was presently drawn into the contest,

and on the whole, though with constant misgivings, frequent shirking, and an occasional disposition to change sides, he took part with the English. He had in his service a skilful and vigorous general (Monacjee, the murderer of Chunda Saheb), who was cordial to English interests. But the Prime Minister was hostile both to the general and to our countrymen. In our first enterprise the number and imposing appearance of the Tanjorines had disconcerted our soldiers, and even our officers. And though this sentiment changed rapidly, it never degenerated into the contempt inspired by the great mass of the Mysoreans. The Tanjorine cavalry were never contemptible when properly handled; which was perhaps partly due to the fact that they were, if not of Maratha race, connected with that people through their reigning house, which had been founded by Eccoji, a brother of Sivagi. Large convoys were supplied to the army in the field, and to the garrison of Trichinopoly, from this rich and well-cultivated district.

Still nearer the beleaguered place, and eastward of Tanjore, lay a thickly wooded region, the domain of a Poligar or chief named Tondiman. He was throughout staunch to the English, or nominally to Mahomet Ally; and at one time his district was almost their only resource for provisions. The intricacies of his woods enabled him to conceal most of his stores when the enemy appeared to chastise and plunder him. It was on the outskirts of these woods that the grenadier corps was cut off.

In the country further south as far as Cape Comorin

the "forest primeval" and the jungle predominated. It was mostly inhabited by a wild and predatory race, though in parts along the sea-coast commerce had made some progress, and a few European factories existed there. The two Marawars, the Greater and the Lesser as they were called, were comparatively unimportant personages at this period, though they gave much trouble afterwards. The sympathies and connexions of the Greater were with the French. The adjoining district of Madura was seized soon after the troubles began, by Allum Ḳhan, a partisan in the interests of Chunda Saheb, whom he joined with a considerable force during the first siege of Trichinopoly. The loss of Madura was the more serious to Mahomet Ally and the English, as it cut off their communication with Tinnevelly, the southernmost portion of the Carnatic, in its wider sense. This last province they had already imperfectly reduced; but an unsuccessful attempt to recover Madura ended in the desertion to the enemy of the bulk of the army which had been employed in Tinnevelly.

Passing from the peculiarities of the country, and the dispositions of the outlying chiefs, to the composition of the main armies, we may first observe that both were much inconvenienced by the want of disciplined and subordinate cavalry. The French had originally a very small body of European Hussars, who were, however, soon drawn into an ambush and destroyed, almost to a man, by the Marathas. The English had a few troopers, all (I believe) volunteers raised in India. Irregular cavalry swarmed on both sides; and the Ma-

rathas, particularly the picked corps of Morari Rao, distinguished themselves greatly in action, even against European infantry provided with guns. But it was impossible to keep them in order even on the field of battle, where they were perpetually rushing on the spoil, when they should have been following up an advantage, and pursuing a routed enemy. The Tanjorine cavalry, greatly inferior to the Marathas in fighting power, were equally addicted to similar practices.

Nor was it only in the crisis of an engagement that these native squadrons were found to be almost useless. Morari Rao was much given to interrupting the whole plan of a campaign by wandering off with his horsemen on private quests, and pouncing down promiscuously upon friends and foes alike. While the Tanjorines as often retired, or were recalled home by their double-minded Rajah. There were fine horsemen among the Mysoreans, particularly those of Hyder Ally and his rival Herri Singh, a Rajpoot. But speaking generally, these people, horse and foot, were, as I have said, despicable. Mahomet Ally's cavalry were even worse than the Mysorean; and the English, after some experience of them, allowed the majority to abscond, and join the enemy in open day, and in the presence of both armies.

Field pieces, first employed in India (Orme says) on this occasion, supplied in a great measure the want of proper cavalry, and were admirably served on both sides. A few such guns often went far to decide the issue of an engagement. They were not yet horsed. Hence they often fell into the rear in the course of a rapid movement on the part of the battalion, and were ex-

posed to much danger of being cut off and taken by the Marathas. The calibre of these guns was six pounds and under. The heavy ordnance employed in sieges, and sometimes as guns of position on the battle-field, were of eighteen pounds.

At the opening of the contest the Sepoy system had hardly been introduced. The Portuguese had long before organized a force of the kind. And Labourdonnais had done the same with his African levies. Dupleix soon adopted this convenient expedient for increasing the small number of his disciplined troops, and the English followed his example. The emergency rapidly developed the system on both sides. When well led and supported by Europeans these soldiers were admirable — laborious, much enduring, courageous, and faithful to their salt. On some occasions they even shamed the Europeans in action, and the writers of the day speak of them with enthusiasm and attachment. The English Sepoys had European serjeants. But the plan of a double staff of commissioned officers does not seem to have been yet introduced. The Commander-in-Chief of all our Sepoys was Mahomet Issoof, a disguished native partizan.

The *topazes* were Christian soldiers, the real or reputed descendants of the Portuguese, and were so called from the hats or *topis* which they wore instead of turbans. They, as well as the Caffres, or natives of African race, were embodied, drilled, and armed in the European way, like the sepoys; and, unlike them, were often blended with the English battalion. Other native infantry were very plentiful, and were marked by various

shades of inefficiency. They bore the general name of *Peons*, and were fit for little else than simple garrison duty. They were very miscellaneously armed and clothed,—sometimes hardly clothed at all—and had no regular organization.

Such was the scene of our narrative, and such were what may be called its indigenous military resources. But, while intent on making the most of local opportunities and instruments, both French and English were ever looking seaward and homeward for the nucleus of their strength. From Europe they awaited the sanction of their hostile enterprises, at a time of peace between the nations elsewhere, and the substantial encouragement of soldiers, arms, *matériel*, and money. Each Company was anxious mainly for its dividends, and averse to engage in operations that might endanger them: neither probably was very unwilling to profit by a safe and cheap war. The French company was both poorer and more narrow-minded than the English. And thus Dupleix's conduct placed him in a very awkward dilemma. For being the aggressor, and having opened a bold and hazardous game, he could only hope to procure the approval of his proceedings by extenuating the costliness of the contest, and exaggerating the chances of success, and of a speedy return for the outlay. While Saunders and his Council, at first believing themselves to be on the brink of ruin, and all along able to represent themselves as fighting in self-defence, were not constrained to be sparing in their applications for aid from home. Thus money at least was supplied to them far more freely than to their adversaries; though this

was to a certain extent balanced by Dupleix's lavish expenditure of his own princely fortune, and the employment of the ample credit which his abilities, connexions, and influence had procured him in India.

The raw material of the troops sent out on both sides seems to have been wretched. Sir Walter Scott, in the "Surgeon's Daughter," has forcibly depicted the results of the crimping system in England and Scotland many years later, when matters were somewhat improved. At this period desertion appears to have been at first particularly common among the English, insubordination and unprofessional cruelty among the French. But the raw material was in the hands of good artificers quickly worked up into an excellent article; and the English Grenadier Corps on the one side, and Bussy's battalion on the other, might have vied with any equal number of men elsewhere for discipline, valor, and good conduct in the field. In such a case more depended than ordinarily on the officers, but especially on the Commander-in-Chief. On one occasion the French ran away. But it was because their officers, baulked of most unreasonable and licentious demands, demoralized the men under them, and threw up their own commissions in the face of the enemy. On another occasion the English ran away. But it was when an irresolute commander had so infected his officers with his own indecision, that, as Orme drily remarks, "they concurred in nothing but in thinking that the enemy were much too strong for them." On the other hand, not only Bussy, Clive, and Lawrence, but officers very inferior to them, shewed what great results might be

obtained with this originally awkward squad, when it had been carefully trained and seasoned, and was steadily and sympathetically managed. Thus, on the fall of a zealous officer at the head of his men, the latter, far from being disconcerted, instantly declared their readiness to follow his successor to—a place hotter than the battle-field!

Such a spirit, however abnormally voiced, was likely to win; and it did so signally on the occasion in question.

In this respect the English had another great advantage. They had a far larger proportion of competent officers than the French.

On the other hand, Dupleix's command over the native mind, and over the conduct of his allies, far exceeded that of the English. Naturally very acute; thrown early on his own resources; having passed most of his life in India engaged in traffic with the natives, not only on the Company's account but on his own—a very stimulating occupation; married to a clever and devoted wife, who had been born in the country, was familiar with its languages and manners, and was thus an invaluable helpmate to him in his subtle schemes; intimate with the family of Chunda Saheb, which had taken refuge at Pondicherry, and initiated by that veteran warrior and intriguer (as I have already called him) in the politics of the country, and the weak points of the enemy's position; thoroughly understanding the native character, and the necessity of taking it as he found it, and dealing with it accordingly; invested with a dignity at which Europeans might sneer, but which

greatly impressed the subjects of the Great Mogul, and enabled him to assume the lordship of the Carnatic, and the dictatorial management of the measures designed to establish the authority of his avowed subordinate there:—his personal endowments, his intimate knowledge of affairs and of men, his confident bearing, and his position as Pro-Viceroy, combined to give him an unprecedented and unrivalled ascendancy in the native community.

Hence, again, the boundless commercial credit which he enjoyed, and which after his own fortune was spent, enabled him, with little help from home, to maintain a long and costly war.

The English had few of these advantages. There was no want of ability among them; but they lacked both knowledge, political courage, and a definite and intelligible *status*. Hence they hesitated, made great mistakes, and were throughout embarrassed by their anomalous situation. They at first left matters to take their own course. Then, when forced to interfere, they did so feebly and awkwardly, and by fits and starts; and when fully and irretrievably committed, they never exactly knew how to treat Mahomet Ally; and suffered much both in toil, blood, pocket, and reputation, from paying the deference which seemed due to the rightful Nabob in whose cause they were fighting, yet which was apt to entail demands repugnant to the plainest dictates of military expediency, to say nothing of political justice and morality.

Thus they were led to commit, or at least to sanction, both follies, and that description of blunders which

Talleyrand pronounced to be worse than crimes. In short, though their bodily presence was by no means weak, their speech was too often contemptible, and their conduct unwise.

Lastly, next to his own genius, perhaps Dupleix's greatest advantage was the possession of such a kindred spirit as that of Bussy. How many of the dazzling visions that had floated before the imagination of the Governor-General were realized by his lieutenant, I must not now pause to enumerate. But one most material consideration must not be forgotten. What was gained in the Dekkan was lost in the Carnatic, and far more. Dupleix's ambition overreached itself. Reinforced by Bussy and his model contingent, he would almost certainly have overpowered our countrymen below the Ghats; and by the capture of Trichinopoly have ended the war, justified his policy, and enhanced his reputation as the irresistible Conqueror and Autocrat of the South, and the most powerful person in India. This single-handed, and with inferior and often inefficient officers, he could not accomplish. And his failure to take Trichinopoly was the proximate—not to say the principal—cause of his recal, and of the ruin of his fortunes. The importance of the Dekkan connexion in itself, and the advantages which it offered at a later time towards determining the ultimate issue of the Carnatic struggle, I am not disposed to underrate. Lally greatly suffered by abandoning it. But Lally was a distinguished soldier, and had officers of distinction under him. While, on the other hand, he had not Dupleix's credit and influence with the natives.

Dupleix, like Carnot, had an administrative genius for war. He had also a strong taste for engineering. But he was unequal to the personal conduct of a campaign. His plans in the Carnatic miscarried in the hands of unworthy agents. And though his French forces outnumbered our own Europeans, they were not sufficiently numerous to be overpowering. Thus the absence of Bussy and his battalion was our salvation, and the destruction of our brilliant adversary.

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